One comment on why some have described your position as an “analytic reading”: finding Heidegger to be a subjective idealist reminds me of a tendency in analytic history of philosophy to group thinkers in categories as if those categories were immutable philosophical perspectives that different thinkers take up in different historical periods. Bringing in foreign categories to a thinker’s work is a necessary condition of interpretation, but the interpreter needs to ensure that in doing so, crucial elements of the thinker’s position, i.e., their difference, isn’t lost. By calling Heidegger a subjective idealist, one loses the attempt in Heidegger to precisely move beyond a subjective-objective binary, to think below, beneath it, at its foundations. Same for idealism/realism. You might say that he attempts this, but falls, and his position is consequently a subjective idealism. In my encounter with Heidegger, I haven’t found this failure to be evident. The privileging of being-in-the-world over dasein/world is, for me, an important step away from the subjective idealism that lingers in Husserl. If there is a threat for leftism in Heidegger, it isn’t a far-right position hidden in this system, but the dissolution of philosophical assumptions common to leftism. As a leftist, one must decide on if this dissolution is sophistic or a positive deconstructive task. A similar difficulty is found in Nietzsche, too.
Yes, my position would be that his attempt fails, and the upcoming Dasein article will be devoted to criticizing the view that Heidegger moves beyond the subjective-objective binary with his concepts of Dasein and world.
The term "subjective idealism" I believe comes from Hegel, though, but I understand the resistance to labeling. It's complex, because these terms have many different meanings.
It's interesting that you would see Husserl as a subjective idealist--I would characterize him as an objective idealist, given Husserl's commitment to scientific realism, universal truths, the existence of reality prior to human consciousness, etc.
What aspects of Husserl would you consider to be overly subjective?
One comment on why some have described your position as an “analytic reading”: finding Heidegger to be a subjective idealist reminds me of a tendency in analytic history of philosophy to group thinkers in categories as if those categories were immutable philosophical perspectives that different thinkers take up in different historical periods. Bringing in foreign categories to a thinker’s work is a necessary condition of interpretation, but the interpreter needs to ensure that in doing so, crucial elements of the thinker’s position, i.e., their difference, isn’t lost. By calling Heidegger a subjective idealist, one loses the attempt in Heidegger to precisely move beyond a subjective-objective binary, to think below, beneath it, at its foundations. Same for idealism/realism. You might say that he attempts this, but falls, and his position is consequently a subjective idealism. In my encounter with Heidegger, I haven’t found this failure to be evident. The privileging of being-in-the-world over dasein/world is, for me, an important step away from the subjective idealism that lingers in Husserl. If there is a threat for leftism in Heidegger, it isn’t a far-right position hidden in this system, but the dissolution of philosophical assumptions common to leftism. As a leftist, one must decide on if this dissolution is sophistic or a positive deconstructive task. A similar difficulty is found in Nietzsche, too.
Yes, my position would be that his attempt fails, and the upcoming Dasein article will be devoted to criticizing the view that Heidegger moves beyond the subjective-objective binary with his concepts of Dasein and world.
The term "subjective idealism" I believe comes from Hegel, though, but I understand the resistance to labeling. It's complex, because these terms have many different meanings.
It's interesting that you would see Husserl as a subjective idealist--I would characterize him as an objective idealist, given Husserl's commitment to scientific realism, universal truths, the existence of reality prior to human consciousness, etc.
What aspects of Husserl would you consider to be overly subjective?