Thank you for this essay, such a clear and meaningful unpacking of Hegel’s dialectical logic. It really resonated with themes I’ve been exploring in my own writing, particularly around objectivity, coherence, and how truth unfolds in tension with contradiction.
I'd love to share ideas or dialogue sometime, your approach intersects deeply with some of the philosophical groundwork I’ve been developing. Feel free to take a look at my work if you're interested.
Appreciate your clarity and the depth of this piece.
Edit: I’m writing from more of a lay lens, but I’d really value the chance to share ideas. If you ever have a moment to glance at my work, I’d be honored to hear your thoughts.
Aristotle's logic is a relevance logic, but it is not paraconsistent. For Aristotle, the principle of non-contradiction is a metaphysical truth about reality.
I believe relevance logics are a species of paraconsistent logic. I have another article on here that talks about Aristotle in relation to paraconsistency. You can check that out here:
Most logicians grant that not all relevance logics are paraconsistent, so it is difficult to make the case that "relevance logics are a species of paraconsistent logic." See for example Graham Priest’s "An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic," 2nd Edition. In "Paraconsistent Logics," Priest and Routley admitted that Aristotle’s logic is not paraconsistent (p. 5). Then in “Paraconsistency and Dialetheism” Priest changed his mind and asserted that Aristotle’s logic is paraconsistent merely because it rejects the explosion principle (p. 132). I doubt it. The question turns on the definition of the term “paraconsistent logic,” which some logicians define broadly, and others define narrowly. Many of us believe that classifying a logic as paraconsistent merely because it rejects the explosion principle is inadequate. Paraconsistent logic and Aristotelian logic reject the explosion principle for very different reasons, and the former claims that many of the argument forms considered valid by the latter are actually invalid. On what basis should we grant that two logics are the same or different? Call me old-fashioned, but since a logic is a theory about which argument forms are valid, I would argue that if one logic evaluates some argument forms as invalid that another logic evaluates as valid, then those two logics cannot be the same logic, and the latter also cannot be a limiting case of the former. Aristotle’s logic requires that relevance be recognized in each instance of implication by abstraction and induction. That makes it specifically different from so-called classical symbolic logic, and its difference from the modern paraconsistent and dialethist logics is even greater, regardless of the fact that they happen to agree in rejecting classical symbolic logic and the explosion principle. Aristotelian logicians typically reject the modern truth-functional interpretation of implication and argue that so-called classical symbolic logic, not relevance logic, is in fact deviant.
Hegel was simply wrong (about logic), that is, his reasoning was at times laughably confused. In particular, his treatment of double-negation was plain non-sense, and this was used as the foundation for his dialectics. But formal logicians are not much better in their own way, their reasoning about validity and truth is also logically inconsistent, in particular, there is no consistent standard of ‘truth’, or even a definition of ‘truth’. Ask any one of them and they will come up with some question begging drivel. Goddam apes! ;)
This was an enjoyable read. I’m thinking through a hypothetical example of how dialectical logic might be applied. Feel free to point out if I’ve not applied it correctly: Imagine a software development team debating whether to adopt a new programming framework. Formal logic might frame the choice with independent premises and fixed conclusions, such as “If the framework is popular, then it is good,” or “If the framework lacks documentation, then it is bad.” These statements stand rigidly apart without showing the development or deeper content of the decision. Using dialectical logic, the team would explore the potential contradictions and transitions in their reasoning. For instance, they start with the abstract idea “the framework should be useful.” But “usefulness” contains potential contradictions like ease of use vs. power and flexibility vs. stability. These contradictions lead to a synthesis: the framework is “becoming” a balanced tool that evolves through use and feedback. The team recognizes the dialectical nature of the concept—how usefulness is not a fixed property but dynamically develops as they engage with the framework, continuously resolving tensions between competing demands to reach a more concrete decision.
Would you say this example accurately illustrates how dialectical logic captures the development and dynamic transformation of ideas through internal contradictions and their resolution, unlike formal logic that treats premises as isolated and static?
Good. One correction: it is not the late Schelling who can sometimes seem problematic to us, but the middle Schelling to the degree that he has not entirely recovered from the problems of the early Schelling. How these three Schellings got along with one another I don’t know, but it’s well documented that they were all on the same bowling team.
Thank you for this essay, such a clear and meaningful unpacking of Hegel’s dialectical logic. It really resonated with themes I’ve been exploring in my own writing, particularly around objectivity, coherence, and how truth unfolds in tension with contradiction.
I'd love to share ideas or dialogue sometime, your approach intersects deeply with some of the philosophical groundwork I’ve been developing. Feel free to take a look at my work if you're interested.
Appreciate your clarity and the depth of this piece.
Edit: I’m writing from more of a lay lens, but I’d really value the chance to share ideas. If you ever have a moment to glance at my work, I’d be honored to hear your thoughts.
Aristotle's logic is a relevance logic, but it is not paraconsistent. For Aristotle, the principle of non-contradiction is a metaphysical truth about reality.
I believe relevance logics are a species of paraconsistent logic. I have another article on here that talks about Aristotle in relation to paraconsistency. You can check that out here:
https://substack.com/home/post/p-156192292
Most logicians grant that not all relevance logics are paraconsistent, so it is difficult to make the case that "relevance logics are a species of paraconsistent logic." See for example Graham Priest’s "An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic," 2nd Edition. In "Paraconsistent Logics," Priest and Routley admitted that Aristotle’s logic is not paraconsistent (p. 5). Then in “Paraconsistency and Dialetheism” Priest changed his mind and asserted that Aristotle’s logic is paraconsistent merely because it rejects the explosion principle (p. 132). I doubt it. The question turns on the definition of the term “paraconsistent logic,” which some logicians define broadly, and others define narrowly. Many of us believe that classifying a logic as paraconsistent merely because it rejects the explosion principle is inadequate. Paraconsistent logic and Aristotelian logic reject the explosion principle for very different reasons, and the former claims that many of the argument forms considered valid by the latter are actually invalid. On what basis should we grant that two logics are the same or different? Call me old-fashioned, but since a logic is a theory about which argument forms are valid, I would argue that if one logic evaluates some argument forms as invalid that another logic evaluates as valid, then those two logics cannot be the same logic, and the latter also cannot be a limiting case of the former. Aristotle’s logic requires that relevance be recognized in each instance of implication by abstraction and induction. That makes it specifically different from so-called classical symbolic logic, and its difference from the modern paraconsistent and dialethist logics is even greater, regardless of the fact that they happen to agree in rejecting classical symbolic logic and the explosion principle. Aristotelian logicians typically reject the modern truth-functional interpretation of implication and argue that so-called classical symbolic logic, not relevance logic, is in fact deviant.
The principle of non-contradiction is not incompatible with paraconsistency.
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/3646253.pdf
Hegel was simply wrong (about logic), that is, his reasoning was at times laughably confused. In particular, his treatment of double-negation was plain non-sense, and this was used as the foundation for his dialectics. But formal logicians are not much better in their own way, their reasoning about validity and truth is also logically inconsistent, in particular, there is no consistent standard of ‘truth’, or even a definition of ‘truth’. Ask any one of them and they will come up with some question begging drivel. Goddam apes! ;)
This was an enjoyable read. I’m thinking through a hypothetical example of how dialectical logic might be applied. Feel free to point out if I’ve not applied it correctly: Imagine a software development team debating whether to adopt a new programming framework. Formal logic might frame the choice with independent premises and fixed conclusions, such as “If the framework is popular, then it is good,” or “If the framework lacks documentation, then it is bad.” These statements stand rigidly apart without showing the development or deeper content of the decision. Using dialectical logic, the team would explore the potential contradictions and transitions in their reasoning. For instance, they start with the abstract idea “the framework should be useful.” But “usefulness” contains potential contradictions like ease of use vs. power and flexibility vs. stability. These contradictions lead to a synthesis: the framework is “becoming” a balanced tool that evolves through use and feedback. The team recognizes the dialectical nature of the concept—how usefulness is not a fixed property but dynamically develops as they engage with the framework, continuously resolving tensions between competing demands to reach a more concrete decision.
Would you say this example accurately illustrates how dialectical logic captures the development and dynamic transformation of ideas through internal contradictions and their resolution, unlike formal logic that treats premises as isolated and static?
To base a socialist model on this word jazz, and then impose it on the workers, is unpardonable.
Good. One correction: it is not the late Schelling who can sometimes seem problematic to us, but the middle Schelling to the degree that he has not entirely recovered from the problems of the early Schelling. How these three Schellings got along with one another I don’t know, but it’s well documented that they were all on the same bowling team.
https://open.substack.com/pub/masroorshah/p/the-scent-of-time-book-review?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=643hzq
You may find it interesting the new conception lf time
I thought the main difference was that, for Hegel, P is not equivalent to not-not-P.
This is an excellent summary.
Point in case, @Buen Ravov
nice